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Growing up, I heard stories about my great grandpa James
Stanton, the son of Irish immigrants who was orphaned at a young age.
James grew up in New York in the early 1900s and eventually made his
way to Utah, where he met and married my great grandma. James rarely
spoke about his parents, and for the longest time the only thing he told us
is that they were Irish. When he died in 1968, that was essentially all we
knew about them. My mother tried repeatedly to find James’ parents and
complete our family tree but continuously ran into dead ends. It was a
family history “cold case” for most of my life. Then, last year, my mother
caught a break in the case and discovered that my Irish orphan great
grandpa James Stanton was actually my Polish runaway great grandpa
Joseph Balkum.
While the revelation that James Stanton was actually Joseph
Balkum sent shockwaves through my family, it did not garner national
attention like the apprehension of the Golden State Killer. The Golden
State Killer terrorized central and southern California in the 1970s and 80s
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on a seemingly unstoppable criminal rampage.1 He is thought to be
responsible for committing sixty home invasions, fifty rapes, and thirteen
murders, making him one of America’s most prolific serial killers.2 While
his crime spree ended in the 80s, the police never captured the Golden
State Killer.3 The case remained unsolved until last year when police
arrested Joseph James DeAngelo Jr. and charged him as the Golden State
Killer.4 While it could be a few years before the trial even starts,
prosecutors are confident that they have their man and say that they will
seek the death penalty.5
While both mysteries were solved last year, on the surface they
have very little in common. What does the discovery of a long-lost grandpa
and the revelation of the identity of notorious serial killer have in
common? Both cold cases were solved using forensic genealogy.
I.

FORENSIC GENEALOGY

Forensic Genealogy is the process of using DNA matches to
reverse engineer a family tree.6 A DNA sample is submitted to a DNA
database (e.g., 23andMe or Ancestry.com), resulting in various matches.
Using those matches, “[f]amily trees are developed for individuals as close
or closer than third or fourth cousins, with an eye to where disparate
branches of the family trees cross, indicating a family where both paternal
and maternal lines combine in a single family.”7 While the DNA match is
* J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2020
1
Paige St. John, et. al, Mapping the Golden State Killer, L.A. TIMES
(June 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/projects/man-in-the-window-crimemap-golden-state-killer-serial/.
2
Id.
3
Breeana Hare & Christo Taoushiani, What we know about the Golden
State Killer case, one year after a suspect was arrested, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/us/golden-state-killer-one-yearlater/index.html (last updated Apr. 24, 2019).
4
St. John, supra 1.
5
Id.
6
Colleen Fitzpatrick & Dee Dee King, Forensic Genealogy—Dead Men
Do Tell Tales, RECORD CLICK PROFESSIONAL GENEALOGISTS,
https://www.recordclick.com/forensic-genealogy-dead-men-do-tell-tales/ (last
visited Mar. 9, 2020).
7
RAY A. WICKENHEISER, Forensic Genealogy, Bioethics and the
Golden State Killer Case, 1 FORENSIC SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL: SYNERGY 114,
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the first step in forensic genealogy, there is more investigation that goes
into it. After a match is found, investigators will use a variety of resources
to complete the family tree. Common resources include “census records,
vital records, newspaper archives, public ‘people search’ databases, public
social media data, and public family trees.”8 If there are two potential DNA
matches for a single sample, descendancy research is performed to trace
the descendants of each set of ancestors to determine if an intersection
between them can be found.9
When my mother uploaded her DNA to Ancestry, her DNA
matched with a second cousin, a woman she never heard of before. My
mother reached out to her and through her own forensic genealogy
discovered the truth about Joseph Balkum, alias James Stanton. Joseph
Balkum ran away from home when he was fifteen after a fight with his
mother. He changed his name and took this secret to his grave. Without
DNA testing, my family would likely have never learned the truth about
our heritage.
Similarly, the Golden State Killer’s DNA was uploaded to
GEDmatch—a public DNA database—resulting in a match to a potential
a distant relative.10 Investigators then used traditional genealogical
research methods to reverse engineer a family tree, leading them to Joseph
DeAngelo.11 Once they suspected DeAngelo, police obtained a sample of
his DNA from his discarded trash and compared it to suspect DNA left at
one of the Golden State Killer’s crime scenes, resulting in a match.12 After
decades of searching, forensic genealogy provided a break in the Golden
State Killer case.

118 (July 12, 2019),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589871X19301342.
8
ELLEN M. GREYTAK, et al., Genetic Genealogy for Cold Cases and
Active Investigations, 299 FORENSIC SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL 103, 106 (Mar.
27, 2019),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0379073819301264.
9
Id.
10
Jocelyn Kaiser, New federal rules limit police searches of family tree
DNA databases, SCI. MAG. (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/09/new-federal-rules-limit-policesearches-family-tree-dna-databases.
11
Id.
12
Breeanna Hare & Christo Taoushiani, What we know about the Golden
State Killer Case, one year after a suspect was arrested, CNN (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/us/golden-state-killer-one-yearlater/index.html.
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While the use of DNA in criminal cases is nothing new, the
increase in access to DNA analyses through Direct to Consumer genetic
testing providers is changing the game. One study suggested that it is often
possible to identify an unknown individual from a single third-cousinlevel match given knowledge of his or her sex, location within 100 miles,
and age within five years.13 Another report claims that “[i]f you’re white,
live in the United States, and a distant relative has uploaded their DNA to
a public ancestry database, there’s a good chance an internet sleuth can
identify you from a DNA sample you left somewhere.”14 A search like that
could potentially identify about 60% of white Americans from a DNA
sample.15 Yaniv Elrich, a computational geneticist at Columbia University
says that, “in a few years, it’s really going to be everyone” that can be
identified.16
Forensic genealogy is still a fairly new and rare application
gaining notoriety as its use in major crime cases increases. There has been
a noticeable increase in the use of forensic genealogy as the popularity of
direct-to-consumer genetic testing providers increased.17 While the
technology that enabled forensic genealogy is impressive and no one is
opposed to catching serial killers, there are still ethical concerns about the
use of DNA and forensic genealogy.18 As Sacramento County District
Attorney Ann Marie Schubert put it, “[i]t is probably one of the greatest
revolutions, at least I would say, in my lifetime as a prosecutor . . . [b]ut it
is a difficult, evolving topic because there are privacy interests at stake in
an area that’s unregulated.”19

13

GREYTAK, supra note 8, at 108.
JOCELYN KAISER, We will find you: DNA search used to nab Golden
State Killer can home in on about 60% of white Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11,
2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-searchused-nab-golden-state-killer-can-home-about-60-white.
15
Id.
16
Id. (quoting Yaniv Elrich).
17
Paige St. John, DNA genealogical databases are a gold mine for
police, but with few rules and little transparency, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-24/law-enforcement-dnacrime-cases-privacy.
18
Benjamin Berkman, The Questionable Ethics of Expanding Forensic
DNA Testing, PAC. STANDARD (Mar. 21, 2019), http://www.psmag.com/ socialjustice/the-ethical-questions-about-expanded-dna-testing.
19
St. John, supra 17 (quoting Ann Marie Schubert).
14

2020
II.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

189

DIRECT TO CONSUMER DATABASES

The U.S. National Library of Medicine defines Direct to
Consumer (DTC) genetic testing as genetic tests that are marketed directly
to customers.20 Customers send the company a DNA sample and receive
their results directly from a secure website or in a written report, without
involving a healthcare provider or health insurance company.21 Consumers
can get information on diseases and health conditions to which they may
be genetically predisposed, as well as information about their ancestry.
These DTC genetic tests increased in popularity in the past few years, with
the tests costing as little as $59.22 The two leading DTC providers are
Ancestry of Lehi, Utah and 23andMe of Mountain View, California.23
Two other popular DTC providers are FamilyTreeDNA (FTDNA) and
MyHeritage.24
A. Terms and Conditions
With approximately 15 million DNA samples, Ancestry is the
largest DTC provider.25 To use Ancestry, a consumer must be at least 18
years old, although a parent with full legal custody may send in his or her
child’s sample.26 A consumer submits a vial of saliva for a DNA test,25
making it nearly impossible for someone to submit a third party’s DNA
sample. Additionally, Ancestry requires “explicit consent” from the
person providing the saliva sample.27
Ancestry maintains a “you own your own data” approach to its
services, which is one of the first things listed in its terms and conditions.28
20

U.S. Nat'l Libr. of Med., What is direct-to-consumer genetic testing?,
GENETIC HOME REFERENCE (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer.
21
Id.
22
Antonio Regalado, More than 26 million people have taken an athome ancestry test, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than-26-million-peoplehave-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/.
23
Id.
24
Greytak, supra note 8, at 106.
25
Id.
26
Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2019),
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions.
25
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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Consumers grant the company the license to their data so Ancestry can
provide products and services.29 At any time, consumers can request that
their data be deleted, and Ancestry will comply.30 Ancestry will not share
genetic data with employers, insurance providers, or third-party marketers
without first obtaining consent.31 Ancestry’s privacy statement makes it
clear that it will not voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement.32 If
Ancestry is compelled to disclose a consumer’s personal information to
law enforcement, it will do its best to provide the consumer with advanced
notice, unless prohibited by law.33 In the interest of transparency, Ancestry
also produces an annual transparency report where it lists the number of
valid law enforcement requests it received for user data across its sites.34
In 2008, Ancestry received ten valid law enforcement requests for user
information and provided information in response to seven of those
requests; all of these requests related to investigations of credit card
misuse, fraud, and identity theft.35 Ancestry received no valid requests for
genetic information of any Ancestry member and stated that it does not
disclose such information to law enforcement.36
23andMe has approximately ten million consumers.37 Like
Ancestry, a consumer can only submit his or her own saliva sample or a
sample for someone for which he or she has legal authority.38 23andMe
has a guide for law enforcement on its site, in which it makes clear that
“23andMe chooses to use all practical legal and administrative resources
to resist requests from law enforcement, and we do not share customer data
with any public databases, or with entities that may increase the risk of law
29

Eric Heath, Setting the Record Straight: Ancestry and Your DNA,
ANCESTRY (May 21, 2017),
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2017/05/21/setting-the-record-straightancestry-and-your-dna/.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Your Privacy, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2019),
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, (last updated Mar.
3, 2020), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency.
36
Id.
37
Greytak, supra note 8, at 106.
38
Terms of Service, 23ANDME (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/.
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enforcement access.”39 However, it does add that, in certain
circumstances, it may be required to comply with a valid court order,
subpoena, or search warrant for genetic or personal information.40
23andMe also periodically publishes a transparency report, which was last
updated on October 15, 2019.41 As of this most recent update, 23andMe
received seven government requests for data from ten specified users and
produced zero data as a result of the requests.42
FamilyTreeDNA has over a million DNA profiles on its site.43
Every DNA test kit consists of two cotton swabs designed to be used by
one individual.44 When a consumer sends in the cheek swabs, he or she
must also send in a signed consent form.45 While FTDNA does not extract
from forensic samples (like hair, toothbrushes, tissues, etc.), it will accept
blood cards for extraction.46 Even though FTDNA advertises the fact that
it cooperates with law enforcement, it still requires law enforcement
officers to request to submit a sample or genetic file to the database.47
Permission is only granted to identify the remains of a deceased individual
or to identify a perpetrator of a homicide, sexual assault, or abduction.48
While FTDNA does not currently have a transparency report, it is working
towards publishing a transparency report “that contains details on all law
enforcement requests for user information that we receive” as well as “the
number of forensic samples and files we have received.”49
Unlike the other three large DTC providers, MyHeritage operates
in Europe.50 As of September 2018, MyHeritage DNA database had
39

23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME,
https://www.23andme.com/law-enforcement-guide/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2020).
40
Id.
41
Transparency Report, 23ANDME,
https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2020).
42
Id.
43
Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing
Companies is Working With the FBI (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbiinvestigative-genealogy-privacy.
44
DNA Test Kit Instructions, FAMILYTREEDNA,
https://learn.familytreedna.com/testing-process/dna-test-kit-instructions/.
45
Id.
46
FamilyTreeDNA Learning Center, FAMILYTREEDNA,
https://learn.familytreedna.com/ftdna/forensic-samples/.
47
FamilyTreeDNA Law Enforcement Guide, FAMILYTREEDNA,
https://www.familytreedna.com/legal/law-enforcement-guide.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
REGALADO, supra note 22.
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approximately 1.75 million DNA users.51 For its DNA test, MyHeritage
requires “a simple cheek swab (no blood or spit).”52 MyHeritage states that
by submitting a sample, the consumer represents that the DNA sample is
his or her own, or that of a person for whom the consumer is a legal
guardian, or of a person for whom the consumer has obtained legal
authorization to provide his or her DNA to MyHeritage.53 Additionally, its
terms and conditions state that “using DNA Services for law enforcement
purposes, forensic examinations, criminal investigations, ‘cold case’
investigations, identification of unknown deceased people, location of
relatives of deceased people using cadaver DNA, and/or all similar
purposes, is strictly prohibited, unless a court order is obtained.”54
MyHeritage does not currently publish a transparency report.55
B. Regulations
The DTC market has been described as the “wild west” due to the
current lack of regulations.56 For a brief period in 2010, it appeared that
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) intended to regulate the
DTC market when it notified a company that its genetic test kit “appeared
to meet the definition of a medical device” under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, giving the FDA jurisdiction to regulate the kit.57 However,
the FDA used its “enforcement discretion” and elected not to regulate the
DTC genetic testing market used for ancestry purposes.58 Additionally, the

51

MyHeritage Has More Than 1.75 Million DNA Users!,
THEDNAGEEK (Sept. 16, 2018) https://thednageek.com/myheritage-has-morethan-1-75-million-dna-users/.
52
How Does DNA Testing Work?, MYHERITAGE,
https://www.myheritage.com/dna.
53
My Heritage – Terms and Conditions, MYHERITAGE, (last viewed
Dec. 1, 2019) https://www.myheritage.com/terms-and-conditions.
54
Id.
55
Id. (Showing that there is an omission of transparency report).
56
Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of
Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 675
(2011).
57
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND THE LAW § 13:15.
58
See Joh, supra note 56; Direct-To-Consumer Tests, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests.
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Federal Trade Commission does not provide any regulation or oversight
of laboratories that provide DTC genetic testing for ancestry purposes. 59
The federal agency that is most directly responsible for regulating
DTC tests is the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The
CMS enforces the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988, a law that applies to all clinical laboratories providing testing
services.60 However, CMS’s regulatory authority only addresses analytical
validity, but not clinical validity.61 Analytical validity measures whether
a lab performing a test reliably identifies the absence or presence of a
certain genetic variation, whereas clinical validity refers to whether the
genetic variant correlates with a specific disease or condition.62 While the
discrepancy between analytical and clinical validity has no significant
bearing on forensic genealogy, it does illustrate the lack of oversite into
these DTC laboratories.
While the FDA does not provide any serious regulation of DTC
tests, it does provide information on the tests on its website.63 The FDA
also makes it clear that no test is 100% accurate. While the FDA does not
regulate ancestry tests, it granted market clearance to 23andMe for its
various health screening options that it offers.64
C. GEDmatch
GEDmatch does not technically qualify as a DTC provider
because consumers do not send their DNA samples directly into
GEDmatch, but it still plays an active role in forensic genealogy.
GEDmatch is a public platform where consumers can upload their DNA
results that they obtained from other DTC providers to compare their
results with other people.65 GEDmatch was crucial in the apprehension of
the Golden State Killer. After the Golden State Killer suspect was
identified through the use of GEDmatch, the site’s administration decided

59

See Joh, supra note 56
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Direct-To-Consumer Tests, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests.
64
Id.
65
Tools for DNA and Genealogy Research, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/login1.php.
60
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to explicitly allow law enforcement to use the site.66 In April of 2018,
GEDmatch informed its users of the following:
While the database was created for genealogical research,
it is important that GEDmatch participants understand the
possible use of their DNA, including identification of
relatives that have committed crimes or were victims of
crimes. If you are concerned about non-genealogical uses
of your DNA, you should not upload your DNA to the
database and/or you should remove DNA that has already
been uploaded.67
Following the arrest of the Golden State Killer and the
announcement of its decision to fully cooperate with law enforcement,
GEDmatch saw a significant increase in the number of participants on the
site.68 Listed in bright red in its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy,
consumers are informed that their DNA may be compared to “DNA
obtained and authorized by law enforcement to identify a perpetrator of a
violent crime against another individual, where ‘violent crime’ is defined
as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or
aggravated assault; [Or] DNA obtained and authorized by law
enforcement to identify remains of a deceased individual.”69 In addition to
fully cooperating with law enforcement, GEDmatch partnered with
Parabon, a company that is constantly comparing the DNA uploaded to
GEDmatch to DNA provided by law enforcement officers trying to catch
a break in their case.70 Parabon monitors all unsolved cases for new
matches on a weekly basis.71

66

Greytak, supra note 8, at 106.
Id.
68
Id. at 107.
69
Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May 18, 2019),
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm.
70
Greytak, supra note 8, at 107.
71
Id.
67

2020
III.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

195

A SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL CASES THAT HAVE USED
DTC AND FORENSIC GENEALOGY

While the Golden State Killer case garnered the most media
attention, it is not the only case in recent years in which law enforcement
officials used forensic genealogy and DTC databases in their
investigations. Since that case, more than thirty rapists, killers, and
victim’s bodies have been identified in the same way.72 Some sources
reported up to sixty-six DNA-derived cases.73 These cases include the
identification of the man who murdered eight-year-old April Tinsley in
1988, and the “NorCal Rapist” who was active from 1991 through 2006.74
The first conviction resulting from a case using forensic genealogy
was in June of 2018 when Washington native William Earl Talbott was
found guilty for the 1987 murder of a British Columbia couple.75 For over
three decades, detectives investigated hundreds of leads but were unable
to crack the case. In 2017, a Snohomish County Sheriff’s detective learned
about Parabon Labs and the possibility of building a family tree that leads
to a suspect.76 The suspect’s DNA from the crime scenes resulted in a
match on GEDmatch with two unrelated second cousins.77 When family
trees were developed based on these matches, Talbott was the only male
carrier for the mix of DNA from the two families.78 DNA on a discarded
paper cup from Talbott’s truck matched the DNA from the crime scene,
leading to Talbott’s arrest.79 The arrest and subsequent conviction
provided peace for the victims’ families, who say, “It feels great to have
some of the answers. We don’t have all the answers, but we have a lot
more than we had for 31 years.”80
While many of the headlines surrounding forensic genealogy are
about its effectiveness in catching killers, it has also been a source of
exoneration. In July of 2019, an Idaho judge dismissed all charges against
72

Regalado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
St. John, supra note 17.
74
Greytak, supra note 8, at 104.
75
SeaTac Man Convicted of 1987 Murders of Canadian Couple After
DNA Evidence Linked Him to Case, SEATTLE TIMES (June 28, 2019, 3:58 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seatac-man-convicted-of1987-murders-of-canadian-couple-after-dna-evidence-linked-him-to-case/.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
73
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Christopher Tapp, a man wrongfully convicted in 1996 of the rape and
murder of an 18-year-old.81 There had long been evidence that Tapp’s
confession to the crimes was coerced, but when forensic genealogy
confirmed that he was not the perpetrator, his name was cleared.82
Interestingly enough, it was the persistence of the victim’s mother that was
most instrumental. She insisted that a genetic genealogist analyze the DNA
evidence in the case, finding a link to another man who confessed to the
decades-old killing.83 While it is disheartening that Tapp was convicted
after a coerced confession, this case does demonstrate that forensic
genealogy has the potential to exonerate as well as convict.
IV.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS

There are mixed reactions to the use of forensic genealogy in
criminal cases, both in the public at large and in the genealogical
community. Prominent genealogists had bitter disagreements over
whether or not police should be able to use genealogical databases that
resulted in groups on Facebook banning the discussion.84 At a genealogical
conference in June of 2019, the different sides of the debate ignored each
other from opposite ends of the bar, refusing to speak to or acknowledge
one another.85 It is a complicated issue because catching murders and
solving cold cases is something that is widely supported for obvious
reasons. It can provide closure for families, as well as bring criminals to
justice. However, there are opposing and competing interests: that of
individual privacy and that of public safety. As one scholar puts it, “[T]o
what extent can the rights of the innocent general public and relatives of
the committer of a crime be infringed upon by interrogating their genetic
data to identify the crime perpetrator and thereby prevent future crimes

81

Mia Armstrong, In an Apparent First, Genetic Genealogy Aids a
Wrongful Conviction Case, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 17, 2019, 4:45 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/07/16/in-an-apparent-first-geneticgenealogy-aids-a-wrongful-conviction-case.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Sarah Zhang, The Messy Consequences of the Golden State Killer
Case, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/10/genetic-genealogy-dnadatabase-criminal-investigations/599005/.
85
Id.
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and improve public safety?”86 Some of the biggest ethical concerns about
forensic genealogy revolve around informed consent, the legal
implications of the technology, and privacy concerns.
A. Informed Consent
Consumers often do not think of the potential implications and
repercussions of submitting their DNA to a DTC provider, especially when
they are doing so predominantly for ancestry purposes. For most people,
this process is done for entertainment or sentimental reasons. As Benjamin
Berkman, the head of ethics of genetics and new technologies at the
National Institutes of Health’s Department of Bioethics, puts it,
“Genealogy is typically done for entertainment purposes. . . . People may
not realize uploading their DNA could be responsible for a cousin’s arrest
as well.”87 While a consumer may readily check the “I have read the terms
and conditions” box, that does not guarantee that they actually read the
terms and conditions. Even if they did, they may not have understood to
what they were consenting. “The terms of service agreements don’t
explain clearly, and even if they did, people wouldn’t read it or find it in
the dense legalese.”88 There was recently a woman in Washington state
who learned after the fact that her DNA on GEDmatch led to the arrest of
her second cousin twice removed, a man who she never met and did not
know, for murder in Iowa.89 While she was initially unsure about how she
felt, she now says, “I feel OK about it . . . I want someone to have to do
time if [he/she] did something like that. I don’t regret it now.”90
There are also issues regarding whether or not DNA donors to
DTC providers actually consented to the analysis of their DNA. While
most DTC providers claim that the DNA submitted to them must be done
so with the DNA donors’ consent, including the four DTC providers
discussed above, there is little done to actually regulate this. Currently,
86

WICKENHEISER, supra note 7, at 119.
Carolyn Crist, Experts Outline Ethics Issues with Use of Genealogy
DNA to Solve Crimes, REUTERS (June 1, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ethics-genealogy-dna/experts-outlineethics-issues-with-use-of-genealogy-dna-to-solve-crimes-idUSKCN1IX5O6.
88
Id.
89
Sarah Zhang, A DNA Company Wants You to Help Catch Criminals,
THE ATLANTIC (March 29, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/03/a-dna-company-wantsyour-dna-to-catch-criminals/586120/.
90
Id.
87

198 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XIII:II
DTC providers have no real incentive to check that the samples mailed to
them legitimately belong to the consumer.91 A journalist at New Scientist
found that “genome hacking” was relatively easy to conduct after he
“collect[ed] his colleague’s saliva from a cup (with his consent).”92 He had
“one company extract the DNA, [had] another amplify the sample to create
enough DNA for analysis, and [had] yet another analyze the DNA for any
medical predispositions.”93 The journalist “also successfully submitted a
cheek swab with his colleague's DNA for analysis.”94 While none of the
companies the journalist used to analyze his coworkers DNA were any of
the above discussed DTC providers, they were all companies that claimed
in their terms and conditions that customers submitting DNA for analysis
had to have the legal authority to do so.95 However, none of them checked
the journalist’s claim that the DNA submitted was his.96 If a consumer can
get the required DNA samples for Ancestry, 23andMe, MyHeritage, or
FTDNA, nothing is preventing him or her from submitting someone else’s
DNA for analysis. It would be as easy as checking the right box or forging
a signature to have someone else’s DNA analyzed through one of these
providers.
B. Legal Issues
It is a well-established aspect of criminal law that law enforcement
officers can use any technology in their investigations that is readily
available to the public,97 so there is nothing specifically barring the use of
forensic genealogy in criminal cases. However, in response to the outcry
of concern since the Golden State Killer case, the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) released an interim policy on forensic genetic
genealogical DNA analysis and searching.98 The policy was approved on
91
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September 2, 2019, and went into effect on November 1, 2019.99 The
Department of Justice stated that they are “committed to developing
practices that protect reasonable interests in privacy, while allowing law
enforcement to make effective use of FGGS [(forensic genetic
genealogical DNA analysis and searching)] to help identify violent
criminals, exonerate innocent suspects, and ensure the fair and impartial
administration of justice to all Americans.”100 They also clarify that any
personal genetic information that is used in this process is not transferred,
retrieved, downloaded, or retained during the automated search and
comparison process.101 None of the information or data derived from
FGGS is uploaded or retained in the CODIS DNA Index, the government’s
own DNA database.102 The policy clarifies that any information derived
from genetic associations are only used as an investigative lead, and no
suspect can be arrested based solely on a genetic association.103 Once a
suspect is identified, the suspect’s DNA must be compared directly to the
DNA sample from the original crime to confirm that the forensic sample
could have originated from the suspect.104
Case criteria are also set forth in the interim policy. Forensic
genealogy may be used by investigative agencies when a case involves an
unsolved violent crime (here defined as any homicide or sex crime) and
the forensic sample is from the perpetrator, or if the case involves the
unidentified remains of a suspected homicide victim.105 Additionally,
prosecutors may authorize the use of forensic genealogy when there is a
substantial and ongoing threat to public safety or national security.106
Investigative agencies are now required to identify themselves as law
enforcement when they are working with DTC genealogy services and can
only work with DTC services that provide “explicit notice” to their users
and the public that law enforcement may use their services.107
The Department of Justice’s interim policy is a concrete step
towards regulating forensic genealogy in criminal cases, but it only applies
in four specific instances. The policy applies to (1) criminal investigations
in which the Department of Justice has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
99
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of the crime and lawful custody of the forensic samples; (2) any criminal
investigation in which the DOJ provides funding to a federal, state, local,
or tribal agency; (3) any criminal investigation in which DOJ employees
or contractors conduct the genealogical research on leads generated
through forensic genealogy; and (4) any federal agency or any unit of state,
local, or tribal government that receives grants from the Department for
the purpose of forensic genealogy.108 While these categories will naturally
encompass many of the law enforcement officers and agencies that want
to use forensic genealogy, there are still state and local law enforcement
agencies that are exempt from these regulations.
An interesting legal point to note is that if a suspect took issue
with forensic genealogy database searching, that suspect would have no
legal standing to bring a claim against the government because the only
person who could bring a suit is the relative whose DNA is used.109 This
could potentially be relevant in cases like that of an innocent twin thrown
in jail in California for suspected rape.110
C. Privacy Concerns
Another concern surrounding forensic genealogy is about
expectations of privacy and issues of abandoned property. Because people
leave discarded DNA in a variety of forms, whether it is skin cells, hair
follicles, saliva on cups, or other ways, it is comparable to discarded or
abandoned property. In this way, it can be considered legally analogous to
trash. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in California v. Greenwood,
wherein it held that its “decisions concerning the scope of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule have balanced the benefits of
deterring police misconduct against the costs of excluding reliable
evidence of criminal activity.”111 This case was a result of law enforcement
requesting that trash collectors retrieve a suspect’s garbage.112 After
officers searched his garbage, they found evidence of narcotics use and
arrested him.113 In its opinion, the Court also made it clear that for
individuals to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, not only must they
108
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have a legitimate expectation of privacy, but also society must “accept that
expectation as objectively reasonable.”114 While the analysis in
Greenwood may have seemed thorough and appropriate in 1988, the
ability to analyze discarded DNA is beyond what many people could have
imagined thirty years ago. Now people’s discarded trash can provide more
than just details about how they live—it has the potential to provide
incredibly personal and detailed genetic information.
The Court in Greenwood makes it clear that states can legislate
the issue further, and in May of 2019, Oregon did just that. In State v. Lien,
the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that the defendants had a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in their garbage, even after the
sanitation company manager retrieved it from a curbside bin and turned it
over to the police.115 There are no facts that strongly differentiate Lien
from Greenwood, other than the fact that Oregon decided to further
legislate the issue of privacy rights in discarded material, like trash or
genetic material. While this has the potential to extend protection and
privacy rights to discarded genetic material, Oregon never explicitly
discussed DNA, genetic privacy, or the potential implications of its ruling.
There are also legitimate privacy concerns that, despite what they
claim, there is nothing to keep DTCs from secretly cooperating with the
police. As revealed by BuzzFeed in January of 2019, FamilyTreeDNA
secretly worked with the FBI and allowed agents to search its vast
database.116 This marked the first time a private firm agreed to voluntarily
allow law enforcement access to its database.117 Despite FTDNA’s secret
cooperation with the FBI, there has been virtually no repercussion, and
FTDNA is now using cooperation with law enforcement as a marketing
strategy.118
V.

MOVING FORWARD

Because using DTC DNA databases for forensic
genealogy in criminal cases is fairly new, there are not many set guidelines
regulating their use. While there have not been any serious negative side
effects as of yet, it would be wise to take preventative measures to ensure
that this technology is not abused.
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A. Informed Consumer Consent and Company Transparency
An important step towards resolving the ethical issues
surrounding forensic genealogy is to encourage consumers to know in
what they are getting. While this will happen naturally as more and more
cases are solved using forensic genealogy and DTC databases, it is
important to encourage consumer awareness now. While individual
consumers have the responsibility to educate themselves, privacy
advocacy groups could also consider social media campaigns, or ad
campaigns to raise awareness. If someone decides to submit his or her
DNA to a DTC provider, the U.S. National Library of Medicine provides
a guide for consumers on how to assess a company’s privacy practice.119
It recommends researching what the company does with the DNA sample
once analysis is complete, determining who owns the genetic data, who
the company will share the data with, whether or not a consumer can “opt
out” of data sharing, and whether consumers will be notified in the future
if the company changes its privacy policies.120
Something that would go a long way towards reducing ethical
concerns would be for every DTC provider with a DNA database to have
an active “opt in” option to government searching. This way, consumers
would be making an active choice to make their genetic information
available for criminal investigations. Officials at FTDNA made it possible
for consumers to opt out of familial matching, which prevents their
profiles from being searchable by the FBI but simultaneously prevents
them from finding possible relatives through DNA testing.121 Companies
should make it possible for consumers to protect their genetic data from
government investigations while still being able to be found by relatives.
In May, GEDmatch revised its policy to an active “opt in,” where
consumers had to actively agree to be included in any searches done by
government agencies.122 This reduced the number of profiles police could
search by 90%, from roughly 1.4 million to 140,000.123 While this
119
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reduction has no doubt disappointed many investigators, it will more fully
ensure that consumers know if their DNA is being used in investigations.
This is an important step towards the balance between genetic privacy and
public safety.
Companies need to be better at ensuring the DNA they are testing
has been sent in with consent. A requirement of written consent from the
specific genetic donor could be a more feasible first step towards
regulating the DTC market and a vital component of any proposed
legislation. A suggested consent form should:
inform the donor of the purpose and scope of testing; the
length of time the sample and results will be retained; the
potential corollary uses, if any, for which the donor's
sample and results will be used; and identification of third
parties that may conduct any testing or analysis of the
sample or results. The form shall also include an “optout” provision in which the donor may elect to have the
sample and results destroyed upon completion of the
stated purpose and scope of testing.124
While a written consent form does not guarantee that someone
cannot masquerade as the genetic donor and forge the donor’s signature,
it provides a legitimate deterrence and is an active step on the part of the
DTC provider to more fully ensure privacy and informed consumer
consent.
B. DNA Privacy Laws
The only current federal legislation that governs genetic privacy
is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966
(“HIPAA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(“GINA”). However, they are both limited in scope, and neither is
applicable to DTC DNA testing.125 About half of the American states have
laws that protect genetic privacy, but there is no level of consistency in
those laws.126 In most American jurisdictions, the nonconsensual
collection of human tissue for DNA analysis purposes is not a crime or
124
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even a civil violation.127 While some states address it on a surface level,
Alaska’s law is the most comprehensive. In Alaska, people are prohibited
from “collect[ing] a DNA sample from a person, perform[ing] a DNA
analysis on a sample, retain[ing] a DNA sample or the results of a DNA
analysis, or disclos[ing] the results of a DNA analysis unless the person
first obtained the informed and written consent of the person.”128 Alaska’s
statute also states that DNA samples and the result of the DNA analysis
are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.129
A suggested change to DNA law is to make DNA theft a separate
crime. Currently, the nonconsensual collection and analysis of another
person’s DNA is virtually unrestrained by law.130 People shed genetic
material on a daily basis in the form of hair, discarded tissues, used cups,
and other ways. There is no preventing the loss of personal, genetic
material. This becomes a problem when third parties retrieve this
discarded genetic material for their own purposes. Police are not the only
ones who may be interested in people’s genetic information. There are also
concerns about political parties analyzing opposing party candidates’
DNA and professional sports teams analyzing athletes’ DNA; similarly,
there are those who are interested in selling celebrity DNA information.131
Under one proposed law, the offense of DNA theft would criminalize the
nonconsensual DNA collection and analysis by third parties. Specifically,
it would “prohibit (1) knowingly taking or storing another person’s bodily
material (2) without consent (3) for the purpose of analyzing or disclosing
the genetic information therein”.132 Other proponents of the introduction
of some sort of DNA theft law point out that any legislation would need
to account for familial relationships and shared genetic information. If
legislation fails to take this in to account, “an individual would have no
recourse against a family member that intentionally or mistakenly shares
‘that person’s genetic secrets.’”133 Any legislation also needs to consider
the inverse—that legislation could go too far and be too stringent, to the
point that family members find themselves subject to criminal or civil
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liability for releasing their own genetic information.134 Because of the
inescapable shared nature of genetic information, it would be important
for these issues to be thoroughly researched and carefully worded so as to
not be too stringent but still be effective.
The United Kingdom passed a law in 2006 that recognized DNA
theft as a criminal offense.135 The Human Tissue Act defines the
nonconsensual taking of another person’s bodily material for genetic
analysis as a criminal offense, unless it is for an approved purpose (i.e. law
enforcement purposes).136 Here, the absence of the tissue provider’s
consent is a central component of the offense.137 If a person is found guilty
of DNA theft, that person is subject to a fine, three years in prison, or
both.138
While making DNA theft a separate crime may not seem to
directly correlate to DTC databases and forensic genealogy, it would
implement another guard against people uploading others’ DNA to a DTC
without their consent. The United States Federal Government could use
the United Kingdom’s Human Tissue Act as a starting model to implement
a law that would criminalize DNA theft. Or, states could start
implementing a law that, at the very least, addresses DNA theft and makes
it a civil violation, even if they do not go so far as to criminalize DNA
theft. Additionally, criminalizing DNA theft and the nonconsensual
collection and analysis of DNA provides motivation for DTC providers to
ensure that the samples submitted to them are done so with legitimate
consent. Adopting a DNA theft offense could also help lend some clarity
to the appropriate Fourth Amendment characterization of genetic
information that people shed. Specifically, “[t]he existence of a DNA theft
offense expresses a social norm that genetic information, wherever it is
found, retains individual privacy interests that deserve protection from
theft.”139
Another suggestion for regulation of DNA privacy, especially in
relation to DTC providers, is to treat it similar to criminal justice
databases. “A high level of structured policy and protection is placed on
use of criminal justice databases, such that this could provide needed
framework to genealogical searching rather than the laissez faire approach
134
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apparent in the direct to consumer marketplace.”140 Safeguards would
include only allowing specific authorized law enforcement individuals to
access and use DTC databases, ensuring there are checks and balances for
access, and strict use of the data that is accessed.141
C. Case Selection Criteria
Realistically, a strict case selection criterion is the preventative
measure that is most likely to be implemented and approved. Currently,
DTC databases have only been used to solve major crimes, such as serial
killer cases and infamous cold cases. Case selection criteria should be set
before the cases begin—that way, law enforcement officers cannot tailor
the criteria to whatever case they are working on when they want to justify
the use of forensic genealogy. Use of forensic genealogy should be limited
to major crimes against a person with a public safety threat. Cases should
be vetted to ensure traditional means of investigation have not succeeded.
To qualify for genealogical searching, there must also be no match made
to a suspect profile in NDIS as well as sufficient DNA for testing to yield
an accurate search against public databases.142
The limited application for cases of major crime is supported by
public opinion, as evidenced by a survey conducted by bioethicists where
79% of 1,587 individuals polled supported use in major crimes against the
person of homicide and rape.143 The support for using forensic genealogy
in cases of property crime was only 39%, whereas respondents were 80%
in favor of using forensic genealogy in cases of violent crime.144
Given the recent implementation of the interim guidelines on a
federal level, this seems like the most probable immediate solution to the
ethical debate surrounding the use of forensic genealogy in criminal
investigation. One bioethicist from the Baylor College of Medicine in
Houston predicts that the federal guidelines will become the national
model because “[he] think[s] people are trying to do this right.”145
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CONCLUSION
The use of forensic genealogy to solve criminal cases is likely to
increase in the coming years, especially given its success in solving cold
cases. While its potential for good is impressive, there are also legitimate
ethical concerns that need to be addressed. As society sees an increase in
the use of forensic genealogy and DTC databases in criminal
investigations as well as an increase in the media attention it garners, there
will be more discussion regarding ethical implications. Legal scholars say
that it is only a matter of time before courts weigh in on the privacy of
DNA,146 and I predict that in the next few years, we will see an increase in
cases and legislation regarding DTC providers and forensic genealogy.
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